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Summary 
Many commentators have pointed to the 1993 IMF loan, which occurred on the eve of South 
Africa’s democratic elections, as a key factor in explaining the shift in ANC economic policy in 
the 1990s. This argument is now invariably taken for granted. Little understanding of the nature 
of the Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) is displayed nor has any hard 
evidence been produced to back this argument. Drawing upon previously unseen data and reports 
from both the National Treasury and the IMF, we show that the IMF loan could not have had 
such an impact on ANC economic policy thinking. 
[MAIN TEXT] 
In many parts of the developing world just the mention of the Bretton Woods institutions, 
especially the International Monetary Fund, brings fear and loathing, much of which is fully 
justified. The manner in which the Fund in particular has dismantled economies and societies in 
borrowing countries in the name of fiscal discipline and liberalization, has been well known in 
Africa and South America since at least the 1980s. So, as the transition to democracy in South 
Africa unfolded in South Africa in the late 1980s and 1990s, there were many, including one of 
the authors of this paper, who were quick to write about what these Washington institutions stood 
for, and warned against the dangers of falling into their grip. In a paper first presented at the York 
conference on the post-apartheid economy, Padayachee noted that, ‘the IMF, a supposedly 
apolitical international agency, can very well form an integral part of the formidable weaponry 
available to the West in shaping the emergence, nature and development of a post-apartheid South 
Africa’ (in Suckling and White, 1988: 202). That sentiment echoes the view of Ronnie Kasrils, 
one of the chief archietcts of the notion of a ‘Faustian Pact’, by which the ANC and South Africa 
is understood to have been caught in a trap, pushed into selling its soul to the forces of global 
capitalism and became a ‘prisoner of the neo-liberal global economy.’ (Kasrils 2014, xxii). Central 
to the mechanism employed by the IMF in shifting ANC economic policy thinking according to 
Kasrils and others (see for example Saul and Bond 2014, 147-8) was the $850 million (about SDR 
614 million) Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) extended by the IMF to 
South Africa once the Transitional Executive Committee was established on 7 December 1993. 
The ‘conditionalities’ attached to that loan, it is argued by such analysts, pushed the ANC towards 
acceptance of the Washington Consensus package of economic policies of what is now known as 
the neo-liberal kind.  
While our whole political history and anti-imperialist thinking is closely associated with such a 
critical approach to the IMF, we argue here that there are many good reasons to cast doubt about 
whether that loan,and the terms and context under which it was approved, served such an 
immediate purpose at that time in contrast to the views reported above. Rather, whilst we do not 
doubt the fact of a sudden and extensive neoliberal turn, which can be dated towards the end of 
1993, the role of the IMF loan in such is at most symbolic not causal (Padayachee and van Niekerk 
2019, Chapter 4). 
Many commentators – both academic and in civil society– have attributed the shift in ANC 
economic policy to the role and influence of the IMF and World Bank, and in particular they cite 
the impact of the 1993 IMF loan to South Africa on the eve of democratic elections as a central 
and not just symbolic factor. John Saul and Patrick Bond (2014, 148) argue that both institutions 
were central to the battle for hearts and minds over economic policy, and they refer specifically to 
the $850 million IMF loan to South Africa in December 1993. In a news report based on his latest 
book, Dr Alan Boesak, an anti-apartheid activist, clergyman and UDF leader makes the following 
claim: 
… this negototiated settlement was sold to the ANC by Western economists and institutions 
such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which argued for the 
adoption of a neo-liberal capitalist system and property ownership model, warning that the 
alternative was an outdated communist model which would damege the economy. (City 
Press, August 20 2017). 
These lines of argument echo that of the respected Stellenbosch academic economist Sampie 
Terreblance (2012, 64) who, in the IMF’s Letter of Intent, sees an embryo version of the 1996 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme adopted in June 1996 by the ANC-
led Government of National Unity. So the question which arises is: are these commentators correct 
in attributing such policy influence to the IMF in general and to the 1993 loan in particular?  
There can be little doubt that the IMF and Bank would have used moral suasion to argue against 
any sort of socialist or communist model for a post-apartheid economy (that is after all to be 
expected), and they had both already become very active in South Africa in the early 1990s after 
a long absence.1 However, we argue that neither institution had a suitable vehicle to force a neo-
liberal policy platform down the throats of the ANC unless the latter had itself come to that view 
through other means. As we argue here a combination of internal forces (including local business, 
the late apartheid state’s residual power and the views of some top ANC economic leaders) was 
more influential in the ANC’s rightward drift to, and embrace of, neoliberalism.  
Typically, since at least the early 1980s, the IMF and World Bank played two key roles in 
influencing economic policy in developing countries. First they both acted to some extent as 
knowledge or ideas banks, based on their ideology, their research and comparative experiences. 
Secondly, they influenced borrowing countries through what is referred to as ‘conditionality’ – the 
policy measures with which such nations had to comply as a pre-condition of receipt of loans. The 
ideological underpinnings of the IMF and World Bank have been described as ‘neo-liberal’ by 
many on the left – and its conditionalities have consisted of a package of market-driven policies 
favouring liberalisation of trade and financial flows, fiscal conservatism, flexible labour markets 
and the like.  
Through the International Monetary Fund, South Africa under apartheid received its first loan from 
the IMF in 1957/8 and its last in 1981, which was repaid in full in 1987. Table 1 displays the 
country’s position with the Fund on 31 October 1993.  
[Table 1 around here] 
The Fund returns to South Africa after 1990 initially as a relatively quiet and junior player 
(compared to a somewhat ‘noisier’ World Bank crowd) and mainly plays its role as a knowledge 
and ideas bank through some policy position papers. In 1992 it publishes its first major report on 
the country (Lachman and Bercuson, 1992), focusing on the growth policies it believed were 
needed in the country. The report was both predictable and pessimistic. It recommended that 
external trade and financial relations should be liberalised (exchange conrols to be abolished, albeit 
gradually, as its later prouncements made clear) as a strategy to eliminate balance of payments 
deficits (Padayachee 1997, 30ff). Later, once sufficient consensus had in its view been reached 
about a more inclusive and democratic government in the negotiations, the IMF received an 
application through the Transitional Executive Council for a Compensatory and Contingency 
Financing Facility (CCFF) of $850 million.2 South Africa owed the IMF nothing at that point (IMF 
1993, 1). The IMF staff report observed that the South African request ‘will relate to a shortfall in 
merchandise export earnings combined with an excess in cereal import costs for the year ending 
June 1993’ (1). The drought was specifically referred to as an exogenous underlying cause. In an 
earlier paper (32ff). Padayachee (1997, 32 )made the following observations on the loan; ‘the loan 
was designed (purportedly) to support South Africa’s balance of payments following the decline 
in agricultural exports and the increase in agricultural imports caused by the prolonged drought’. 
However, as Patrick Bond (2000, 68) has correctly pointed out the drought had ended 18 months 
before, raising concerns about the rationale for the application. Even the IMF Staff report 
acknowledged the end of the drought and commented that, ‘in light of the end of the drought and 
more favorable gold prices, the current account surplus is expected to increase from 1 percent of 
GDP to about 1.5 percent in 1993.’ (IMF 1993, 8).  
The IMF approved the loan on condition that a ‘legitimate body, gave its undertaking that the 
economy was responsibly managed’, in our view a low or no conditionality approval. The Letter 
of Intent which accompanied the loan facility warned in general terms against the dangers of 
increases in real wages in the private and public sectors, stressed the importance of controlling 
inflation, supported trade and industrial liberalization, and repeatedly espoused the virtues of 
market forces over regulatory interventions. Ostensibly drawn up by the borrowing government 
(in this case the TEC) but normally drafted by the IMF, the TEC also promised to consider the 
introduction of ‘inflation targeting’ and a cut in the budget deficit to 6 per cent of the GDP ‘within 
a few years’ (Padayachee 1997, 32). These were far from the usual stringent and quantifiable IMF 
conditionalities on longer-term loans with targets for key macroeconomic balances,3and, indeed, 
the loan being very much of a temporary nature (repayment within thirty days) was not subject to 
weighty conditions. All these factors lead to the inevitable conclusion that the loan came without 
typical conditionalities though there are differing opinions on the subject. Sampie Terreblance 
(2012, 64) argues that ‘the Letter of Intent committed the TEC to the ideologies of neo-liberalism 
and market fundamentalism’.  
Why do we differ? It has to be noted that,if a country borrows within its SDR quota, ie that is if 
the loan could be accessed from its own reserves at the Fund (a reserve tranche drawdown) there 
is normally minimal or no conditionality. That was the case here. South Africa borrowed only 45 
percent of its quota4 and, as no other obligations were due in 1993 (as confirmed in the IMF Staff 
report), there would have been no or very minimal conditions in terms of IMF policy, as confirmed 
by Dr Cyrus Rustomjee, former special advisor to the Deputy Minister of Finance and former SA 
representative at the IMF (email exchange 11 December 2017). In an interview with Robbie van 
Niekerk, one of us had already hypothesised, ‘that the loan came without conditions. People think, 
oh, they took the IMF loan and therefore they had to implement the program, [but] the IMF loan 
came without conditions’. (Interview, London, 30 June 2015).  
The IMF historian James Boughton (2012, 692) argues from a more political angle that ‘entering 
into a stand-by arrangement with the IMF, with all of the attendant policy conditions, would have 
been unthinkable for the authorities as well as for the IMF.’ This unusually sympathetic stance 
(based on political factors, and unthinkable in IMF history) is clear from the tone of the appraisal 
set out in the 1993 IMF Staff report. Here is the key paragraph: 
South Africa is at the beginning of a fundamental transformation that is both inspiring and 
fraught with difficulties. It is inspiring because; at last, one is able to envisage the resources 
of the country--its enormous natural endowment, its wealth of entrepreneurship, and its 
sophisticated' economic and financial institutions--being put to work to better the lives of 
all the people. It is fraught with difficulties because the economy is still largely mired in 
recession and is scarred by eight years of sanctions and decades of apartheid. It will take 
time to ameliorate these conditions and popular aspirations may well be inconsistent with 
the pace dictated by fiscal and external constraints. (IMF 1993, 18/9) 
Our interpretation is shared too by the then DEP Deputy Head Tito Mboweni, later SARB 
Governor, who strongly refutes the view that the ANC sold out by accepting a loan with specific 
conditionalities: 
The end result was that we agreed to that request by the then government to approach the 
IMF for the required balance of payments support called the Compensatory and 
Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF). There were no conditionalities attached since this 
was a soft loan as it were.However, we had to provide the IMF with a ‘Statement on 
Economic Policy’. The statement was fairly simple: assure the IMF that the future 
government will pursue prudent macroeconomic policies. This was something that the 
ANC in particular had adopted as an approach as early as 1992 in a document entitled – 
Ready to Govern. We did not sell out! ... I emphasize that any careful reading of the 
statement will find no contradiction with Ready to Govern. But that is a matter for political 
economists to sort out in due course. (Mboweni 2004, 1/2) (our emphases) 
Mboweni’s view is confirmed in the IMF (1993, 20) Staff report where it is noted that, ‘it is the 
staff's view that implementation of the policies described in the authorities’ ‘Statement of Policies’ 
would constitute the maintenance of a prudent macroeconomic stance.’  
So what was the origin of and logic for the application? The Letter of Intent was clearly in 
preparation as early as November 1993 well before the TEC began its work. We are now aware 
that an IMF staff mission visited Pretoria, Johannesburg, and Cape Town during October 7-18 
1993, ‘to conduct the 1993 Article IV consultation discussions and to discuss prospective access 
to Fund resources under the compensatory and contingency financing facility’, (CCFF) (IMF 1993, 
1). This lends credence to the view that it was the National Party government which pushed for 
the loan (Mutize 2017) using the multi-party Economic Techinal Committee (ETC) established by 
Finance Minister Derek Keys sometime in 1992 after his appointment. This is confirmed in the 
IMF (1993, 3) Staff Report. It should be no surprise that Keys was an important player here. Patti 
Waldmeir’s (1997, 258) account is somewhat simplistic but she does make the important point 
that, ‘[Derek] Keys’s all party economic team, the Economic Technical Committee’ played a 
central role in persuading the parties of the value of such an application to the IMF. The ANC had 
finally bought into the world consensus on good economic government, and was applauded 
internationally for so doing’. She argues that the De Klerk regime ‘could not believe their luck at 
the economic transformation of their adversaries (though Keys ensured that they judiciously 
avoided crowing about it, which might have jeopardized the conversion.’5 
On 5 November 1993, DEP Head Trevor Manuel, requested comment from the MERG Office6 on 
the draft IMF Letter of Intent, and especially its quantitative dimensions. Manuel sent the draft 
letter of intent to MERG via the National Economic Forum. John Sender’s cover letter in reply to 
Manuel, following discussion held with some MERG researchers who were based in the Wits 
Economics Department, is worth quoting in full, as it has never been referred to by any source 
before. Sender replied as follows: 
Dear Trevor, 
I think the ‘quantification’ is less important than some of the ideological biases, or the 
theoretical straight jacket that Keys/IMF would like to lock the next government into. If 
you accept, or make explicit, the sort of theory they are pushing, then a wide range of policy 
options become closed. 
I have tried to eliminate the phrases which suggest acceptance of inadequate and failed 
theory, as well as those phrases likely to cause trouble with COSATU. I don’t think it is 
worth fussing too much about the quantification on page 4, since it is qualified by words 
like ‘aim’, ‘about’, ‘projected’. There are all sorts of legitimate reasons why government’s 
aims might be frustrated and approximate, projected targets not actually be realised. 
Finally, the best (original emphasis) method of negotiating on these letters is to call upon 
the services of powerful people in Washington, rather than negotiate with Lipshitz or 
delegations to S.A. Have you considered approaching the Clinton adminstration directly, 
or lobbying the IMF representatives of the Scandanavian, Dutch countries who could put 
pressure on the Fund at the Executive Board level… 
Pp, Signed John Sender. 
An attachment of one and a half pages sets out the changes, deletions, additions that John Sender 
proposed (accessed in the private archive of Vishnu Padayachee). 
We do not know if Manuel followed Sender’s suggestion to lobby likely supportive allies (though 
we doubt whether he did), nor if any of the contents of the letterwas debated at the DEP. What we 
know is that the Letter of Intent was kept a secret for months until it was leaked to the Business 
Day in March 1994, a month before the elections. It only then became clear that none of the even 
relatively modest and pragmatic changes proposed by Sender made it into that final approved 
Letter of Intent. So either the proposed changes were presented by the ANC/TECto the IMF and 
simply ignored by the latter, or they were never presented to the IMF by the South African side as 
the basisfor the negotiations. The Letter of Intent was signed off by the IMF and on the South 
African side by Derek Keys on behalf of the TEC, Dawie De Villiers on behalf of the National 
Party, and Pravin Gordhan on behalf of the Congress alliance (NIC/ANC) on December 3 1993, 
and later ratified on December 7 1993 when the TEC formally came into effect.  
Patrick Bond (2000, 155ff and https://medialternatives.com/2016/04/15/patrick-bond-responds) 
was working as the coordinator of the RDP at the time, and he remarks that the IMFs Managing 
Director Michael Camdessus put intense pressure on the TEC to ensure the re-appointment of 
Finance Minister Derek Keys and Reserve Bank governor Chris Stals. We know that the Mandela 
government acceded to this apparent pressure so, in this respect, the Fund may have got its way. 
However, in the course of other research (Padayachee and van Niekerk 2017 and 2018), we were 
informed by a very authoritative source on condition of strict anonymity that Mandela had 
expressed a wish that Stals stay on as Governor of the SARB after the latter’s term ended in August 
1993 and that this informal proposal occurred in the course of a chance meeting between Mandela 
and Stals as early as 1991. 
If we are correct in our intepretation, it suggests that the 1993 IMF loan was not really 
needed for balance of payments reasons, but rather that it was a signal of the IMF’s ‘stamp 
of approval’ for South Africa’s democratic transition and its economic policies in effect 
encouraging private international lending, trade and investment to the country. That softer 
line, so atypical of the IMF’s approach to other developing countries at the time, appears 
to have informed the IMF approach to Mandela’s ANC. At that critical stage in South 
Africa’s transition to democracy, such a stamp of approval must have been regarded as 
important to Keys and the late apartheid government, even to some of the incoming ANC 
leadership. James Boughton (2012, 692) makes the point clearly: 
Major creditor countries recognized the global political importance of aiding the 
transition to democracy, but they also knew they had to have some assurance that 
committing money to the country would help and would not be wasted. The IMF, 
with its technical expertise and its regular dialogue with the authorities, was the 
natural conduit for determining when and how the international community could 
safely resume lending to South Africa.  
But the ANC concern about potential IMF and World Bank interference with its sovereignity 
comes to the fore again once this stage was over. Effectively in power after April 1994, the ANC 
leadership was able to push its own policy stance and resisted all early attempts by the IMF 
Managing Director Michael Camdessus to persuade the new government to accept more of its loan 
facilities.UCT Business School lecturer Mishack Mutize (2017) takes this view on the ANC’s 
stance: ‘When the African National Congress (ANC) came to power after the elections in April 
1994 it walked away from the IMF offer. Its concern was mainly that the IMF would undermine 
the sovereignty of the newly established democracy by imposing inappropriate, policy choices that 
would have further harmed poor people‘. Boughton (2012: 695) makes the same point as follows: 
When the new government showed no inclination to seek the Fund’s help, [Camdessus] 
sent Alassane Ouattara (Deputy Managing Director)7 to Cape Town in February 1995 to 
discuss the matter with Mandela and other officials, but Ouattara found that much of the 
leadership was still hostile to the IMF. A visit by First Deputy Managing Director Stanley 
Fischer in December was no more productive. Bitter memories persisted of the Fund’s past 
support to the minority government, and many political leaders believed that IMF lending 
would come with unacceptable restraints on economic policies and would threaten the 
country’s sovereignty.  
After GEAR was in place and following a visit by IMF MD Camdessus to Mandela’s home in 
October 1996, another IMF loan looked a better than even bet. Why would the MD himself visit 
Mandela unless something big was in the offing. But while the world awaited the formal 
announcement of an IMF loan to South Africa, the ANC revealed its hand by vetoing any new 
borrowings from the Fund (Boughton 2012, 698). 
From Table 2 it appears that democratic South Africa repaid the CCFF loan in full in two equal 
instalments in 1997 and 1998 – which was clearly a delayed payment – as CCFF ‘repurchases’ 
(repayment in normal parlance) at the time had to be made within thirty days. Such delays are 
typically recorded as such but no such ‘default’ record can be found in this case, clearly a case of 
quiet condonation.8  
[Table 2 around here] 
It has been a somewhat harder task to track down whether (and despite its concerns) the ANC-led 
government in fact drew down on the $850m CCFF facility in support of strengthening its balance 
of payments and (if it did) in what ways did it utilize the loan. It has proven incredibly difficult to 
come to a definitive answer to this question. Cyrus Rustomjee argues that it may have been drawn 
down but he is not certain (email exchange 11 December 2107). Many officials at both the National 
Treasury and the SARB initially claimed (embarrassingly) not to remember whether it was drawn 
down or not. After further investigation and many leads and deadends, we received an email on 10 
December 2017 from Johan Krynauw, a long-standing official of the Treasury and Programme 
Manager at the National Treasury’s Public Debt Management division who confirmed our 
suspicion and hunch. Speaking of developments after 1994 he confirms that, ‘I can’t remember a 
time where the National Treasury of South Africa ever drew down on an IMF facility.’ The loan 
was repaid in eight quarterly instalments over two years, totalling just over SDR 307 000 in each 
year (1997, 1998), though the table shows two equal payments, which must have been simply an 
aggregation of the payments on an annual basis. 
This official confirmation strengthens our argument that the IMF loan was no more than a stamp 
of approval, pushed by Keys and the National Party, arguably with good reasons from their point 
of view, that it came with no or very low conditionality, and that it had little or no effect on the 
economic policy positions of the ANC or the ANC-led GNU. This conclusion, if correct, punches 
a hole in the (Faustian Pact) argument of those claiming that the ANC was pushed towards neo-
liberalism by the stringent ‘conditionalities’ imposed by the IMF on the 1993 CCFF (although this 
may have been conveyed to, and wrongly believed by, ANC participants in negotiations at the 
time, let alone as ex post justification for the, or their, neoliberal turn). In fact, there is a whole 
‘industry’ of opinion that has blindly supported such a Faustian Pact narrative about how ANC 
economic policy thinking was shaped in which the IMF and the 1993 loan are central.  
So here are our somewhat ironic conclusions: 
• The ANC leadership did not take or make use of the loan, and certainly further loans, for 
fear of loss of sovereignty or of a more or less popular backlash against the leadership as 
well as for ideological reasons reflecting the past (even though the present was dominated 
by IMF [and World Bank] thinking and even personnel). 
• Yet the ANC leadership was persuaded (by internal forces including local capital and the 
late apartheid state) of the need for a (self-imposed) austerity programme, very much in the 
IMF tradition if not pressed hard by the IMF itself Padayachee and van Niekerk 2017) 
• The end result was the worst of all possible worlds – IMF-type policies without IMF 
financial support! 
In the latter respect, at least, South Africa might be seen as an early, extreme and leading 
example of what the IMF can be critically interpreted to mean by country ownership of policy-
making (doing what the IMF would do without being told to do so and, in South Africa’s case, 
with the added bitter pill of not being paid to do so). Indeed, even at this early stage, more 
important than explicit or even implicit conditionalities and influence exerted by the IMF 
through access to, and use of, its funds, may have been its role in sustaining and consolidating 
centralized and authoritarian forms of economic policymaking, with Treasury (later 
complemented by the Presidency) to the fore. Corresponding modes of policy-making under 
the Mandela/Mbeki Presidencies more than prepared the way for state capture characteristic of 
Zuma’s disastrous ten-year administration (Public Protector 2016, Kasrils 2017 and Bhorat et 
al 2017). 
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alliance to develop an alternative progressive macroeconomic policy framework for the expected 
ANC led post-apartheid government. Its report, delivered at the end of 1993 was precipitously 
discarded by the ANC leadership. See MERG (1993). 
7 And later Prime Minister and President of Cote d’Ivoire. 
8 There is a sense in which the loan was never repaid because it was never taken! In brief, the 
IMF CCFF was a facility that once approved could be drawn on for balance of payments support. 
But the borrowing country could choose for whatever reason not to draw on the loan, as with this 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
for South Africa and subsequently. In any event, the loan would have to be repaid, like any 
similar facility offered to a customer in the private banking sector. 
